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the maxim of caveat emptor does by the law of England 'apply;
but if so, there are many exceptions stated in the judgment which
well nigh eat up the rule."
BYLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. It has frequently been
said that a mere sale of chattels, like copyright or patent right,
does not involve a warranty of title ; but there has been no judg-
ment on that point, and it is clear that there may be a warranty
of title, by the conduct of the party, or by the surrbunding cir-
cumstances of the case. In 2 Kent's Com. 487, it is said, -That
if the seller has possession of the article, and he sells it as his.
own, and not as agent for another, for a fair price, he is under-
-stood to warrant the title; but if the possession be in another,
the rule of caveat emvtor dpplies," and he refers to a dictum of
HOLT, 0. J., in Medina vs. Stoughton, 2 Salk. 210; and also one
of. BULLER, J., in Pasley vs. Freeman, 3 T. R. 58.
KEATING, J., concurred.
Rule discharged.
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ADMINISTRATOR.
May recover back Claim paid if the Estate appears to be insolvent.-
Statute of Limitations.-If an administrator has, within a year after his
appointment, paid a claim against the estate of his intestate, in the hon-
est belief that the estate was solvent, and the estate has been subse-
quently declared insolvent, and after due proceedings a dividend has
been ordered to be paid from all the assets then available, the administrator
1 From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. 2 of his Reports.
2From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in Vol. 43 of his Reports.
3 From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. 9 of his Reports.
4 From N. L. Freeman, Esq., Reporter.
5For these abstracts we are indebted to the kindness of the Judges. The
volume of Reports in which they will appear cannot yet be designated
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
may at once commence an action to recover back the excess so paid,
above the amount of the dividend, although there are some further assets
which may at some time in the future be realized; and the Statute of
Limitations will begin to run against the claim of the administrator from
the date when the dividend was ordered: Richards vs. Nightingale, 9
Allen.
AGREEMENT.
Mutual Covenants- Waiver of Breach-Measure of Damages.-The
plaintiff and defendants entered into a written agreement, by which the
former agreed, for a certain sum, to be paid him by the latter, to do all
the carpenter's work upon a school-house to be erected, and to furnish and
use all the requisite materials: and that he would commence said work,
and would "proceed therewith, without delay, and in such a manner as
not to delay the contractor for the mason-work :" Bld, that this latter
covenant raised an implied obligation on the part of the defendants to
have the building in readiness for the plaintiff to perform the condition:
Allertnan vs. The .Mayor, &c., of Albany, 43 Barb.
-Held, also, that this was a mutual covenant, binding on both of the
parties, on the part of the plaintiff, that he would commence and proceed
at once, and on the part of the defendants that they would be ready to
allow him to do so: Id.
And that the plaintiff, having sustained damag6 by reason of the
defendants' delay in having the building ready for him to do the work
stipulated, he could maintain an action to recover the amount: Id.
Reld, fitrther, that the plaintiff did not waive the defendants' breach
of the contract, by going on, without complaint or objection, and com-
pleting the work. That he had a right to proceed with it, after the
breach, and compel the defendants to pay the increased expenses incurred
by reason of the delay: Id.
And, that an action to recover such increased expenses might be main-
tained upon a quantum neruit, independent of the contract: d.
Held, also, that the plaintiff having been delayed in the performance
of his contract, by the act or omission of the defendants, until wages
were higher, and the prices of materials increased, he was entitled to
recover the additional amount he was obliged to expend, in completing
his contract: 1d.
BLOCKADE.
May be by Batteries on Land as well as by Ships-Does not terminate
by Capture of the Place-Is presumed to continue until Discontinuance is
announced by the Blockading Government-essel is liable to Capture
.from time of Sailing-Evidence of Intent to break Blockade.-A block-
ade may be made effectual by batteries on shore as well as by ships
afloat; and, in case of an inland port, may be maintained by batteries
commanding the river or inlet by which it may be approached, supported
by a naval force sufficient to warn off innocent and capture offending
vessels attempting to enter: The (Circassian, Sup. Ct., U. S.
The occupation of a city by a blockading belligerent does not termi-
nate a public blockade of it previously existing; the city itself being
hostile, the opposing enemy in the neighborhood, and the occupation
limited, recent, and subject to the vicissitudes of war. Still less does it
€
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terminate a blockade proclaimed and maintained not only against that
city, but against the port and district commercially dependent upon it
and blockaded by its blockade : Id.
A public blockade, that is to say, a blockade regularly notified to
neutral governments, and as such distinguished from a simple blockade
or such as may be established by a naval officer acting on his own dis-
cretion, or under direction of his superiors, must, in the absence of clear
proof of a discontinuance of it, be presumed to continue until notification
is given by the blockading government of such discontinuance: Id.
A vessel sailing from a neutral port-with intent to violate a blockade
is liable to capture and condemnation as prize from the time of sailing;
and the intent to violate the blockade is not disproved by evidence of a
purpose to call at another neutral port, not reached at time of capture,
with ulterior destination to the blockaded port: Id.
Evidence of intent to violate blockade may be collected from bills of
lading of cargo, from letters and papers found on board the captured
vessel, from acts and words of the owners or hirers of the vessel and the
shippers of the cargo and their agents, and from the spoliation otpapers
in apprehension of capture: 
Id..
BOND.
Executed on condition thzat it shall be signed by Another.-A bond for
the payment of money, was executed by several persons, at the same
time, as sureties, upon the representation that another person, D., would
sign it as co-surety, and with the understanding that B., one of the obli-
gors, was to take the bond, but was not to deliver or use it, until after it
was signed by D. Some of the obligors would not have signed the bond
except on this coqdition, and they did not otherwise authorize its deli-
very. B. delivered the bond to the obligee without having procured the
signature of D. thereto: Held, that there was no valid delivery of the
bond; that it was incomplete, and the transaction not consummated;
and, that the condition on which the instrument was executed not having
been performed, the obligors were not liable: The People vs. Bostwick
et-al., 43 Barb.
Held, also, that this was not a case where the rule that where one of
two \innocent parties must suffer, he who has employed the agent, and
enabled him to commit a fraud, should be the loser, rather than a
stranger, was applicable; the plaintiffs occupying the position of one
taking a security, to which the party giving it had no title: Id.
That, if the rule of principal and agent applied, then the obligors
would only be liable for such acts as they authorized. And the power
given being conditional, and the condition on which its exercise depended
not having occurred, and the delivery being entirely unauthorized, the
principals were not bound: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Obl4qatiou of Contracts.-A statute repealing a former statute, which
made the stock of stockholders in a chartered company liable to the cor-
poration's debts, is, as respects creditors of the corporation existing at
the time of the repeal, a law impairing the obligation of contracts, and
void. And this is so, even though the liability of the stock is in some
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respects conditional only.; and though the stockholder vu not made, by
the statute repealed, liable in any-way, i.his person or property gene-
rally, for the corporation's debts: Hawthorne vs. Calef, Sup. Ct., U. S.
Jurisdiction of National and State Courts.-In trespass in la Mtate
court against the marshal of the United States for levying on goods
which ought not to have been levied on, the marshal's -title as mafthal
is not necessarily drawn in question. He may be sued, not as marshal,
but as trespasser. Hence, a suit in a state court against a marshal for
making a levy alleged to be wrong, is not necessarily a proper subject
for review in this court, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act,
allowing such review in certain cases where "an authority exercised
under the United States is drawn in question, and the decision is against
its validity :" Day vs. Gallup, Sup. Ct., U. S.
Where a proceeding in the Federal court is terminated so that no case
is pending there, a state court, unless there be some special cause to the
contrary, may have jurisdiction of a matter arising out of the same
general subject, although, if the proceeding in the Federal court had
not been terminated, the state court might not have had it: Id.
CONTRACT.
Title to Reward offered for Recovery of Stolen Property.-If a reward
is offered by the owners of stolen property, for its recovery or the detec-
tion of the thief, one who gives to them information by which, with rea-
sonable diligence on their own part, ihey are enabled to recover the pro-
perty and detect the thief, is entitled to the reward, although he does
nothing further to aid in the recovery of the property or conviction of
the thief: .Besse vs. Dyer, 9 Allen.
Excuse for kon-Performance---Suit while the Contract is ~eeeutory-
Abandonment of Contract-Acceptafnce by Other Party.-Performance
of a contract to build a house for another on the soil of such person, and
that the work shall be executed, finished, and ready for use and occupa-
tion, and be delivered over so finished and ready to the owner of the soil,
at a day named, is not excused by the fact that there was a latent defect
in the soil, in consequence of which the walls sank and cracked, and the
house, having become uninliabitable and dangerous, had to be partially
taken down and rebuilt on artificial foundation: Dernmtt vs. Jones, Sup.
Ct., U. "S.
While a special contract remains executory the plaintiff must sue upon
it. When it has been fully executed according to its terms, and nothing
remains to be done but the payment of the price, he may sue either on
it, or in indebitatus assumpsit. relying, in this last case, upon the coin-
mon counts; and in either case the contract will determine the rights
of the parties: Id.
When he has been guilty of fraud. or has wilfully abandoned, the
work, leaving it unfinished, he cannot recover in any form of action.
Where he has in good faith fulfilled, but not in the manner nor within
the time prescribed by the contract, and the other party has sanctioned
or accepted the work, he may recover upon the common counts in "in-
debitatus assumpsit:" Id.
He must produce the contract upon the trial, and it will be applied as
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far as it can be traced; but if. by fault of the defendant, the cost of the
work or material has been increased, in so far the jury will be warranted
in departing from the contract prices. In such cases the defendant is
entitled to recoup for the damages he may have sustained by the plain-
tiff's deviations from the contract, not induced by himself, both. as to the
manner and time of the performance: Id.
CORPORATION.
Books -Evdence-Entries.-The books of a corporation, although
evidence to prove the acceptance of its charter, its organization,
election of officers, and other corporate acts, are not admissible in
matters of a private nature, in support of its own claims against a
stranger, nor even against a member who claims adversely, and not
under the corporation : Wheeler et al. vs. Walker, Sup. Ct., N. H.
Entries by a person since deceased, made in the usual course of busi-
ness, and by one whose duty it was to make them, and who had no
interest to misrepresent the facts, are admissible in evidence: Id.
COURTS.
.Jiurisdiction of the United States not taken away by reduction of
amount in controversy after it has once attached.-The meie fact that
an Act of Congress authorizes a judgment obtained by the government
against a party, to be discharged by the payment of a sum less than
$2000, is no ground to ask a dismissal of a case of which the court had
properly obtained jurisdiction before the act passed. The party may
not choose thus to settle. the judgmeut, but prefer to try to reverse it
altogether: Cooke vs. The United States, Sup. Ct., U. S.
When the sum in controversy is large enough to give the court juris-
diction of a case, such jurisdiction, once properly obtained, is not taken
away by a subsequent reduction of the sum below the amount requisite:
Ad.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
llegal Consideration.-If A. is indebted to B. for the price of intox-
icating liquors sold in violation of law, and B. is indebted to C. for a
legal consideration, and A. executes, for his indebtedness to B., a note
and mortgage to C., who has knowledge of the illegality of the debt to
B., such note and mortgage are invalid: Baker vs. Collins, 9 Allen.
DECEDENT'S ESTATE.
Advancement by Executor for his Testator's Estate.-Although an
executor has advanced his own moneys to pay valid claims against the
solvent estate of his teatator, and dies without settling his account, or
receiving enough from the estate to reimburse himself, and the balance
due to him has been settled in the Probate.Court upon an account filed
by his administrator, the latter cannot maintain an action against the
administrator de Zonis pon of the testator's estate to recover the amount
so found due: Munroe vs. Holmes, 9 Allen.
DoWER.
Widow of Tenu ant in Common.-The widow of a tenant in common,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
whose interest was conveyed in his lifetime, without release of dower, to
his co-tenant, may maintain a writ of dower, and have her dower set out
to her by metes and bounds: Blossom vs. Blossom, 9 Allen.
EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.
Revival of Mortgage after Payment.-A. made three promissory notes
to B. for $6250 each, payable at different times, and executed a mort-
gage to secure them. The equity of redemption of the mortgaged.pre-
mises was then transferred .to C., under whom the defendants derived
their title, with notice of the circumstances, to be detailed, claimed as
constituting an equitable mortgage. The first note falling due was paid
and taken up by C., B. receipting its payment on the back thereof. C.
then applied to D., under whom the complainants claim, for a loan of
money, and by an agreement between B., C., and D., the receipt of pay-
ment upon the note was erased, and it was indorsed to D. An agree-
ment was then written on the back of the note, which was signed by C.
and B. as follows :-" Received of D., as purchaser and assignee, the
full amount of the within note and interest from date (the intexest to
the 10th May on the other two notes being paid by C. as above), and in
consideration of such purchase-payment I hereby sell, assign, and trans-
fer the within note to said D., with all interest accrued or to accrue,
including the incident security by trust deed of A. the maker. But it
is understood that D. is not to proceed thereon until I shall have had
time and.opportunity to collect my said two next notes, included in same
security by deed or mortgage. It being understood that C., assignee
of A. (who also undersigned), is to have three years from date to pay
this note by his allowing or paying 10 per cent. interest on the advance
purchase-money (amount on 10th May last $6625; one and a half
months more to 25th June is $46.87--6671.87), so advanced in pur-
chase of this note by said D. B.
"Chicago, June 24th, 1856.
"And said C. hereby agrees to pay the within note and interest
accrued, besides the 10 per cent. hereafter as above. C.
"Chicago, June 24th, 1856."
Held, that although the agreement between the parties was insufficient
to revive the mortgage at law, as to the first note, it was clearly suffi-
cient to charge the land as an equitable mortgage: Peckham vs. Had-
duck, Sup. Ct., Ills.
EQUITY.
Enforcement of Stale Trusts.-Courts of equity, acting on their own
inherent doctrine of discouraging, for the peace of society, antiquated
demands, refuse to interfere in attempts to establish a stale trust, except
where
1. The trust is clearly established.
2. The facts have been fraudulently and successfully concealed by the -
trustee from the knowledge of the cestui lue trust: Badger vs. Badger,
Sup. Ct., U. S.
And in cases for relief, the cestui que trust should set forth in his bill,
specifically, what were the impediments to an earlier prosecution of his
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claim; how he came to be so long ignorant of his rights, and the means
used by the respondent to fraudulently keep him in ignorance, and how
and when he first came to a knowledge of his rights: Id.
HOMESTEAD.
Jurisdiction of Probate Court.-The probate court has no jurisdiction
to' set out an estate of homestead, if the right to it is disputed by the
heirs or devisees: Woodward vs. Lincoln, 9 Allen.
Abandonment-Ejeetment.-Where the plaintiff in ejectment, A.,
being the owner of the premises in controversy, which were worth less
than one thousand dollars, and occupying them as his homestead, con-
veyed them 'by deed, executed by himself and wife, but containing no
release of the homestead, either in its body or acknowledgment, to B.,
and after the execution of the deed removed from the house with his
family and gave possession to B., who moved in and occupied the same
until lie, B., sold and conveyed to the defendant in error, when the
latter succeeded to his possession: /Reld, that these circumstances
created an estoppel in pais against both husband and wle, and would
for ever debar them from asserting a homestead right as against their
grantee, or persons claiming under him: Brown vs. Coon, Sup. Ct., Ills.
Married Woman-EstoppeL.-Although a married woman may not be
bound by the covenants in her deed, even by way of estoppel, yet in
reference to the homestead right she may well be held estopped by her
voluntary acts in pais, as completely as if she were feme sole-at least
to the extent of preventing the commission of fraud: Id.
Cases Explained.-The language of the court in Patterson vs. Enight,
29 Ills. 514, and Best vs. Allen, 30 Id. 30, apparently importing that a
deed conveying a homestead, but not containing a special release thereof,
according to the statute of 1857, is an absolute nullity, is too general and
sweeping, though, if interpreted with reference to the case before the
court, there is nothing in it to which exception could be justly taken.
Such a deed is not an absolute nullity. When the plaintiff made his
deed it was not void, but remained inoperative until the actual occu-
pancy of the homestead was transferred to the grantee. It then took
effect as fully as if it had been executed in conformity with the require-
ments of the Homestead Law. Where the naked legal title to the fee
was vested, intermediate to the delivery of the deed and the delivery of
the possession, is purely a metaphysical speculation, into which it is
bootless to inquire : Id,
Mortgage of Homestead.-The cases of Boyd vs. Cudderbuck, 31 Ills.
113, and Smith vs. Miller, Id. 157, holding that when the value of the
homestead premises exceeds one thousand dollars, a mortgLige upon them
is good for the excess, though the homestead right does not pass by the
deed,-confirmed: Id.
Indictment-Sfflciency of Evidence.-In an indictment for illegal
voting at a town meeting, it is sufficient to allege that such meeting was
duly holden, without stating how, or by what authority it was warned:
State vs. Christopher J. .Marshall, Sup. Ct., N. H.
Where it is alleged that a town meeting was duly holden for the elec-
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tion of two representatives to the General Court, and that the inhabitants"
were also "called on to give in their votes for Member of Congress,"
&c., it was held that in respect to the representatives to Congress, u
well as representatives to the General Court, these allegations were to
be regarded as descriptive of the purpose for which the meeting was
called, and not that at a meeting called for another purpose, votes for a
Member of Congress were called for: Id.
The law requiring six months' residence in a town or ward to entitle
a person to vote, is valid and constitutional: Id.
To establish the fact that the respondent was not entitled to vote in
the ward in question, it may be sufficient to prove the circumstances of
his actual residence during the year previous to the election; and thQ
state is not necessarily bound to prove directly where his domicil was
before that time, or that it had not been in the ward in question: Id.
INSURANCE.
Mutual Company-Suit on Premium Note.-In assumpsit by a
mutual fire insurance company against one of its members upon his
premium note, promising to pay to them a certain sum of money in such
portions and at such times as the directors of the company may, agree-
ably to their act of incorporation and by-laws, require, where, under the
charter and by-laws, the defendant is liable to assessment only for losses
and expenses dccurring during the term mentioned in his policy, the
plaintiffs cannot recover unless they show an assessment duly made for
such losses or expenses: The Great Falls M. F. Ins. Co. vs. Harvey,
et al., Sup. Ct., N. H.
Where A. has duly become a member of a mutual fire insurance
company, and subsequently the company passes a by-law, which is in
conflict with their charter, this by-law cannot, unless assented to by A.,
impair his rights under his previous contract: Id.
In a suit by a mutual fire insurance company against a member upon
'his premium note, the assent of the member to a by-law, adopted by.the
company after the making of his contract with them, will not be pre-
sumed, if the by-law is in conflict with the charter of the company, and
if it would change and impair his rights under his contract: Id.
MORTGAGE.
Tender-Interest-Sales of several Parcels-Row charged-Redemp-
tion.-Where one having the right to redeem mortgaged lands, tendered
to the holder of the mortgage the full amount of the mortgage-debt,
which was refused, and afterwards brought his bill in equity to redeem:
held, that the defendant was not entitled to interest after such tender,
although the bill at first omitted to offer payment of the mortgage-debt,
but was subsequently amended for that purpose; it appearing that it was
merely a formal defect in the bill. In such case the holder of the mort-
gage having unreasonably resisted the redemption, was required to pay
costs: Brown vs. Simons et al., Sup. Ct., N. H.
Where the plaintiff hlid acquired from the mortgagor a portion of the
mortgaged land, and afterwards the mortgagor sold several other parcels
to other parties, it was decreed, that the plaintiff might redeem by pay-
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ing to the mortgagee the amount so tendered and refused; and then to
have and retain a lien upon all the mortgaged lands for the sum so paid,
and interest thereon from the time of the tender, together with the
sums paid by him for taxes to preserve the estate: and it was further
decreed, that the lands still held by the mortgagor being primarily.
charged, and then the parcels so sold, being charged in the inverse order
of sales, that the owners of such parcels should severally be permitted
to redeem his or their parcel, by paying to-the plaintiff the value there-
of, as ascertained by a master, with interest, within one year--payments
to be made in the order above named, until the whole sum is paid-and
if any such owner shall fail to redeem his or their parcels, as aforesaid,
within the time limited for it, then the right of redeeming such parcel
shall be for ever barred and foreclosed, and the land accounted for at the
aforesaid value upon said mortgage-debt: .d.
It was further decreed, that the expenses of the plaintiff, for counsel-
fees in this suit, and time bestowed upon it by himself, are not to be
added to the sum to be paid him for redemption, and that as between
him and the defendants, who were holders of the parcels so sold by the
mortgagor, no costs are to be allowed either way: Id.
MUNICIPAL OOIrPORATION.
Dedication of Land for Street-Rigts of Proprietors-Convyance
6ounded by Street-Acretions on the Line of such Street.-A plat of an
addition to a town, not executed, acknowledged, and recorded in con-
formity with the laws of Illinois, operates in that state as a dedication
of the streets to public use, but not as a conveyance of the fee of the
streets to the municipal corporation: Banks vs. Ogden, Sup. Ct., U. S.
A conveyance, by the proprietor of such an addition, of a block or lot
bounded by a street, conveys the fee of the street to its centre, subject
to the public use: Id.
When a street of such an addition is bounded on one side by Lake
Michigan, the owner of the block on the other side takes only to the
centre; while the fee of the half bounded by the lake remains in the
proprietor, subject to the easement: id.
When the lake boundar r so limits the street as to reduce it to less
than half its regular width, the street so reduced must still be divided
by its centre line between the grantee of the lot bounded by it and the
original proprietor: Id.
Accretion by alluvion upon a street thus bounded will belong to the
original proprietor, in whom, subject to the public easement, the fee of
the half next the lake remains: LZ.
The limitation of the 8th section of the Bankrupt Act of 1841 does
not apply to suits by assignees or their grantees for the recovery of
real estate, until after two years from the taking of adverse posses-
sion : Id.
Doubted, whether that limitation can be applied to sales of real estate
by assignees under orders of district courts having general jurisdiction
-in bankruptcy: id.
Ordinance to prohibit Swine from running in Streets.-A city ordi.
nanee, providing that no person shall permit any swine under his care
-to go upon any sidewalk in the city, or otherwise occupy, obstructinjure,
510 ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
or incumber any such sidewalk, so as to interfere with the convenient
use of the same by all passengers, is within an authority conferred by the
charter to make all such salutary and needful by-laws as towns by the
laws of the Commonwealth have -power to make: Commonwealth vs.
Curtis, 9 Allen.
Contracts of; Validity of Ordinances.-An ordinance passed by a
municipal corporation must be made to conform strictly to the provisions
of the charter; otherwise, the proceedings under it will be without
authority and void; and no action will lie against the corporation to
recover for work and labor done under it: Cowen vs. The Village of
West Troy, 43 Barb.
Where the contract under which work is done for a municipal corpo-
ration is void, because entered into in violation of its charter, the con-
tractor cannot recover for the work in any form; neither under the
contract nor upon a quantum mcruit: 1d.
A person contracting with a municipal corporation is bound to see
that the provisions of its charter have been complied with; and, if he
proceeds without doing so, he must take the consequences of his temerity
or want of care: Id.
PLEADING.
Set- Of-If a defendant files a set-off, under the provisions of Gen.
Sts., e. 130, the plaintiff, in answer to the declaration in setoff, may
in his turn file a set-off to the defendant's demands: Galligan vs.
Faunder, 9 Allen.
RES ADJUDICATA.
Rule not confined to Cases where the matter is patent in the Pleadings
-Pa rol Proof-Ejectment-One Judgment may be conclusive by state
law, and this will be binding on United State.s Courts.-The esta-
blished rule, that where a matter has been once heard and determined
in one court (as of law), it cannot be raised anew and reheard in anbther
(as of equity), is not confined to cases where the matter is made patent
in the pleadings themselves. Where the form of issue in the trial,
relied on as estoppel, is so vague (as it may be in an action of eject-
ment) that it does not show precisely what questions were before the
jury and were necessarily determined by it, parol proof may be given to
show them: Miles vs. Caldwell, Sup. Ct., U. S.
The reasons which rendered inconclusive one trial in ejeetment have
force when the action is brought in the fictitious form practiced in Eng-
land, and known partially among ourselves; but they apply imperfectly,
and have little weight, when the action is brought in the form now
usual in the United States, and where parties sue and are sued in their
own names, and the position and limits of the land claimed are described.
They have no force at all in Missouri, where the modern form is pre-
scribed, and where, by statute, one judgment is a bar: Id.
A state statute, enacting that a judgment in ejeetment-provided the
action be brought in a form which gives precision to the parties and
land claimed-shall. be a bar to any other action between the same par-
ties on the same subject-matter, is a rule of property as well as of proc-
tice, and being conclusive on title in the courts of the state, is oonelpiive,
also, in those of the Union: Id.
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SALE. -
Vedor's Lien; Waiver of.-A vendor's lien upon the land sold, for
the purchase-money, can only be waived by taking collateral security, or
by an express agreement to that effect. YIhe party disputing the lien
must show that the vendor agreed to rest on other security, and to dis-
charge )he lien: Dubois vs. Hull, 43 Barb.
The rinciple of equitable lien is founded on the presumed intention
of the rties : Id.The C presumes an intention on the pert of the vendor to retain his
lien for the purchase.money, and imposes upon the purchaser the burden
of proving the contrary: Id.
D., by his agent, proposed to sell a piece of land to a corporation, and
to receive in payment therefor stock of the company to a specified
amount. A committee of the corporation made a report recommending
the acceptance of this proposition, which was adopted; but no further
steps were taken to pay for the land in stock, nor was any stock ever
issued for that purpose. D. conveyed the land to the corporation, but
the consideration-money was never paid: Rid, that the circumstances
of the case did not show a waiver of the vendor's lien for the purchase-
money. Nor did the fact that the vendor had put his demand for the
purchase-money into a judgment, before attempting to enforce the lien,
evince an intention to waive the lien: .d.
Where the vendor has recovered a judgment for the purchase-money,
it is no defence to an action to enforce his equitable lien, that he has not
issued an execution upon the judgment: Id.
SEcURrTY.
Mor age to Accommodation Indorser.-If the maker of a promissory
note give a mortgage as security to an accommodation indorser, whose
liability upon the note afterwards becomes fixed, the indorsee, after the
insolvency of the maker and indorser, is entitled to have the mortgage
assigned to him, although the condition of it is only for the security of
the ipdorser, and not to pay the debt. If, however, the indorsee has
proved the debt against the several estates of the maker and indorser in
insolvency, and by his vote has secured the discharge of the indorser, he
cannot afterwards, upon withdrawing his proof, compel an assignment
of the 'mortgage to himself: New Bedford Institution for Savings vs.
Fairhaven Bank, 9 Allen.
Alteration of Bond without Knowledge of Surefy.-Where several
person sign a bond to the Government as surety for a Government offi-
cer, whichbond, statute iequires shall be approved by a judge, before
tihe odier ebtgrs on the duties of his office, an erasure by one of the
sureties of his nime from the bond-though such erasure be made before
the instrument i submitted to the judge for approval, and, therefore,
while it is uncertain whether it will be accepted by the Government, or
ever take effect-avoids the bond, after approval, as respects a surety
wvio had not been informed that the name was thus erased; the case
being one where, as the court assumed, the tendency of the evidence was,
that the person whose name was erased signed the bond before or at the
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
same time with the other party, the defendant: Smith et at. vs. United
States, Sup. Ut., U. S.
Any unauthorized variation in an agreement which a surety has
signed, that may prejudice him-, or may substitute an agreement different
from that which he came into, discharges him: Id.
TAXATION.
Life Estate where Tenant dies.-If executors hold property in trust,
the income of which is to be paid to A. during life, with remainder over
to B., and it is taxed to the executors as of the 1st of May, and A. dies
within the year and before the tax is paid, the tax cannot be apportioned
by the executors between A.'s estate and B., but is chargeable wholly
upon the income due to A.'s estate: .Holmes vs.- Taber, 9 Allen.
TROVER.
Converson-Notice.-Purchasing a horse in good faith from one who
had no right to sell him, and subsequently exercising dominion over him
by letting him to another person, will amount to a conversion; and no
demand by the owner is necessary before commencing an action there-
for: Gilmore vs. Newton, 9 Allen.
VERDICT.
Irregular Mode of estimating Damages.-Where" the jury.agreed
that to fix the amount of the plaintiff's damages, each juror should mark
a sum, and that half of the aggregate of the highest and the lowest sums
which should be marked, should be taken for such damages, and made
up and returned their verdict according to this agreement and without
any further deliberation: Meld, that the verdict should be set aside:
Boynton vs. Trumbull, Sup. at., N. H.
USURY.
A correspondent at Toledo, calls our attention to the statement of the
law of Ohio in regard to usury, in our article on that subject in our April
number, p. 323, note. As our article might be apt to mislead the profes-
sion in other states, we subjoin the, corrected statement of the present"
law, kindly furnished by our correspondent. (Eds. Am. L. Reg.)
"The law of Ohio (Act of January 12th, 1824) limits the rate of inter-
est to six per cent. in all cases, and the Act of February 18th, 1848,
provides: "that in all actions for the recovery of -money," all payments
of usurious interest shall be deemed, "as to the excess of interest above
the rate allowed by law," as payments upon the principal--so, that only
the e=ess of interest is forfeited."
